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Summary 
Overall, the book qffers a well-intentioned attempt to broaden the appeal of 
denotational semantics to a wider audience. Schmidt has done a good job in trying 
to make the material accessible, while also including mathematical details. Some 
stylistic decisions are unfortunate and render the text less clear in places. The 
incorporation of material on inverse limit solutions to recursive domain equations, 
powerdomains, non-determinism and concurrency, and the generally more up-do- 
date nature of the material, distinguish this book from the competing literature. The 
author has been careful to warn the reader that certain topics (such as full abstraction) 
are still the subject of active research, and indeed because of this he only touches 
briefly on such issues in the text. On the whole, despite notational drawbacks and 
a few more or less minor problems, I think that the book may be recommended as 
a basis for a course on semantics. There is more than enough material for a single 
semester course, but Schmidt makes reasonable suggestions on course planning in 
his preface. To provide a well rounded comprehensive coverage of the material and 
its application to programming language design and implementation I feel it would 
be advisable in addition to consult Tennent’s book, and possible Stoy or Gordon. 
Steve BROOKES 
CMU, 
Pittsburg, U.S.A. 
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Near the end of his life, John von Neumann produced a short book [l] in which 
he argued that the human central nervous system must employ a kind of mathematics 
which is structurally essentially different from the mathematics that we consciously 
and explicitly work with. In other words: the way our brains process most of their 
information is not at all like the way a mathematician solves algebraic equations 
or proves theorems on a blackboard. If so-and subsequent experience has done 
nothing to cast doubt on von Neumann’s conclusion-then we need a mathematical 
analysis of information processing appropriate to biological organisms. It is with 
the quest for such a biological mathematics that Michael Arbib’s book, Brains, 
Machines and Mathematics, is avowedly pre-occupied. 
Arbib’s point of departure is what he sees as a confluence of several intellectual 
currents concerned with the notions of intelligent automata and control. These 
currents are: 
(i) Craik’s theory of reasoning-by-simulation [2], 
(ii) Rosenbleuth, Wiener and Bigelow’s study of feedback and control [3] and 
(iii) McCulloch and Pitts’ threshold units [4], 
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an idea which itself arose out of earlier work in neurophysiology and the C%del- 
Turing theory of computability. Some of these currents, Arbib explains, later began 
to diverge, with artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, gripped by the 
paradigm of the serial computer as a model for the mind, divorcing itself from 
neurological research. In recent years, however, in part because of technical develop- 
ments discussed below, a new rapprochement has emerged, with workers in artificial 
intelligence and cognitive psychology again turning their attention to analysing the 
neurological underpinnings of cognition. And it is with the mathematical aspects 
of neurological models of information-processing and computation that Brains, 
Machines and Mathematics i very largely concerned, hence the author’s assertion 
in the preface to the second edition: “This is a book whose time has come-again.” 
But what, exactly, is biological mathematics? We can best get a feel for what Arbib 
has in mind by looking at the treatment of neural networks (Chapters 4 and 5). As 
already mentioned neural processing paradigms have undergone a recent resurgence 
after a period of relative neglect; let us review the history. 
Prior to 1969, several neural-style models of information-processing had been 
proposed, of which one of the best known was the McCulloch-Pitts threshold model 
of the neuron. This (formal) device has a number n of binary input units and a 
single binary output unit with the former being connected to the latter as in Fig. 1. 
The interpretation of such a device as a neuron equates the input units with the 
dendrites of other neurons which impinge on it, and the output unit with the axon 
of the neuron. 
Each input unit in the mocIe1 is either active or inactive during a given cycle: if 
input unit i is active, it sends a signal of pre-assigned value, Wi, called a weight, to 
the output unit; if the input unit is inactive, it sends a signal of value 0. The output 
unit sums all the incoming signals and becomes active just in case the total exceeds 
a pre-assigned threshold 8. With appropriate weights, the threshold logic unit can 
be used to compute some (but not all) functions of n binary-valued variables. 
Moreover, it is possible to ‘train’ such a device to compute a given function, merely 
by providing it with examples of correct input and output. That is, there is a 
procedure for modifying the weights w, , . . . , w, and the threshold 8 in response to 
a series of input-output patterns supplied by a teacher, which will eventually lead 
to a set of weights suitable for computing the function being taught (provided, that 
is, that sufficient examples are given and that the function is one of those which a 
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threshold logic unit can compute). This is the so-called perceptron learning theorem: 
if a perceptron (for our purposes, a McCulloch-Pitts neuron) can compute a 
function, it can learn to do so from examples. 
A well-known result due to Minsky and Papert fixes limits on which functions 
the McCulloch-Pitts neuron can compute (an example of a function not computable 
by a threshold logic unit is the 2-ary boolean function XOR [5]), a result which 
coincides with-and is sometimes credited with causing-the decline of the neural 
paradigm in artificial intelligence. However, this negative result applies only to 
single-layer networks in which the input units are connected directly to output units, 
as in Fig. 1, and thus has no bearing in more general networks in which “hidden” 
units are interposed between the input and output units. These more general networks 
can easily be shown to have the comptuational power of finite state automata (any 
given automaton can be simulated by a neural net), and can thus have the computa- 
tional abilities of, for example, any existing digital computer. The recent revival of 
neural computing has been largely due to the development of learning algorithms 
for such networks. 
The perceptron story nicely illustrates the application of mathematics to the study 
of information processing by biological systems: the perceptron learning theorem, 
Minsky and Papert’s negative result and recent learning theorems for more general 
networks tell us what certain classes of biological models can and cannot account 
for. This is exactly the kind of application of mathematics to living systems which 
Arbib has in view. The resulting collection of theorems (presented with proofs, 
accompanying explanation and an outline of some related neurological findings) 
constitutes a compact yet contentful mathematico-historical analysis. 
This analysis notwithstanding, I remain to be convinced that the mathematical 
techniques and theorems that Arbib discusses will have a very great influence on 
our understanding of neural information processing. For the fact is that, as the 
neural networks get more complex and powerful, the mathematical treatment of 
them becomes less tractable, and greater reliance has to be placed on empirical 
generalisations. Some of the recent work of Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams affords 
a good example. The neural network they present [6] is not guaranteed to learn to 
compute all the functions that it could compute. No matter, they assure us: experience 
with many examples suggests that the ratio of successes to failures for most interesting 
functions is very high. Now there is nothing whatever wrong with justifying a 
computational framework on empirical grounds, nothing wrong either with a compn- 
tational framework which works not always but only for the most part. However, 
the tendency of many researchers in neural computing to place a great reliance on 
empirical measures of success (in the absence of mathematics! guarantees) does 
not bode well for the enterprise of biological mathematics. Only time will tell whether 
recent developments in neural networks succumb to useful and tractab!e mathemati- 
cal analysis; at present, the discipline appears to be largely empirical. 
What of the other mathematical strands which Arbib tries to weave in? Here the 
outcome is less encouraging. Turning to the discussion of feedback in Chapter 3, 
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we are presented with a second-order differential equation with sketch-graphs of 
some possible solutions, together with excerpts from Wiener’s analysis of ataxia (a 
neurological disorder) in terms of defects in the feedback mechanisms of the human 
nervous system. But nowhere is the mathematics used for anything. Aside from a 
few unimpressive qualitative analogies between neurological disorders and some 
solutions to a differential equation, the formulae do little but make the relevant 
pages pretty to look at but difficult to read. The sceptical reader who suspects that 
control theory is of no use in understanding intelligent behaviour is likely to have 
his suspicion bolstered rather than undermined by Arbib’s discussion. 
Again, staying with Chapter 3, Arbib takes several pages to establish the following 
result: take a function f which maps strings of symbols from a given alphabet to 
single symbols; in terms of J we may define a “discrete time system” (a kind of 
formal machine with a next-state function and an output function) which will, at 
each time, output f(a) where u is the string of inputs up to that time; moreover 
this machine can be defined so as to have no redundant states. Not a terribly 
surprising result, and not one that is going to lead to any giddy advances in 
understanding biological systems. But neither does it serve as a foundation for 
theorems later on in the book which do have these properties. Arbib does not explain 
what light it sheds on his subject. 
The other major mathematical strand in this book consists of a presentation of 
the GGdel-Turing theory of computatiliby. Turing machines are defined and 
explained, and some elementary theorems such as the recursion theorem proved. 
There is an interesting chapter on the theory of self-reproducing automata-material 
not standardly found in introductory textbooks-coupled with a discussion of its 
relation to problems in evolution. And the last chapter of the book contains a proof 
of GGdel’s first incompleteness theorem (and related results) followed by an assess- 
ment of its relevance to the question of whether the human brain can transcend the 
computational limits of a Turing machine. 
Here too, I Icar, the biological relevance of the mathematics is fairly minimal. 
Concerning self-reproducing automata: as Arbib candidly admits (pp. 157-158), his 
mathematical models of automata which build increasingly complex daughter- 
automata constitute at best a grossly simplified “model” of biological evolution; 
and the worry must be that relaxing the simplifying assumptions will render the 
mathematics intractable. 
The other application of a mathematical result to intelligent systems, the discussion 
of GBdel’s theorem and what Arbib calls the “brain-machine” controversy, is of a 
different nature from those that have gone before. Here, Arbib’s point is negative: 
no, GGdel’s theorem does not show that brains (or even, I suppose, minds) somehow 
transcend the limits of the effectively computable. I agree. Of course no such 
sensational and improbable conclusions follow, and Arbib does a creditable job of 
rejecting them. But this is not so much an application of mathematics to biological 
systems as an explanation of why the relevant mathematics does not have the 
applications claimed for it.’ 
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Finally, style and presentation. The very great economy of space and the mathe- 
matical nature of much of the text make this book difficult to read. Matters are not 
helped in this regard by the style of writing which, I regret to say, I frequently 
found to be graceless and unclear. The presentation is further marred by a number 
of misprints in the mathematical formulae. 
To summarise. Arbib’s book collects together a wealth of mathematical results 
and neurological findings pertaining to the processing of information by intelligent 
organisms. It is an economical book, guided by a sharply focused vision of the 
application of mathematical techniques to its subject matter. It furnishes the reader 
with a galaxy of important references from all of the contributing fields, as well as 
a useful compendium of theorems and proofs. The discussion of neural networks 
in particular has considerable merit in this regard. Unfortunately, the impression 
created by much of the book is that the mathematics discussed is of little use in 
understanding information processing in intelligent biological systems. In that 
respect, I am unconvinced of the book’s central message. But even if my lack of 
conviction is justified, it is a more informed lack of conviction than it would have 
been witbout Arbib’s book. In that respect, I have reason to be grateful. 
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Concurrent Program Structures. By D. Bustard, J. Elder and J. Welsh. Prentice-Hall, 
London, 1988, Price E15.95, ISBN 0 13 167080 8. 
The monitor-construct, a tool for indirect process-interaction, has since it was 
proposed in the early seventies, been adopted in many programming languages. 
Examples are Modula, Concurrent Pascal, Concurrent Euclid and Pascal Plus. This 
book provides an introduction to monitor-based design of concurrent programs. 
The book begins by giving a motivation and an introduction to central concepts. 
Emphasis is put on modular program decomposition. Then the modular design is 
gradually transformed into monitor-based programming notation. The algorithms 
are implemented in Pascal Plus, a language originally developed by two of the 
authors. 
